Bat-borne viruses carry undeniable risks to the health of human beings and animals, and there is 16 growing recognition of the need for a "One Health" approach to understand their frequently 17 complex spillover routes. While domesticated animals can play central roles in major spillover 18 events of zoonotic bat-borne viruses (for example, the swine-amplified Malaysian Nipah virus 19 outbreak of 1998-1999), the extent of their potential to act as bridging or amplifying species of 20 these viruses has not been systematically characterized. This review aims to compile current 21 knowledge on the role of domesticated animals as hosts of two key types of bat-borne viruses: 22 henipaviruses and filoviruses. A systematic literature search of these virus-host interactions in 23 domesticated animals identified 72 studies globally, which were categorized by year, location, 24 design, and type of evidence generated. We then focused on Africa as a case study, comparing 25 research effort in domesticated animals and in bats with the distributions of documented human 26 cases. Major gaps remain in our knowledge of the potential ability of domesticated animals to 27 contract or spread these zoonoses. Closing these gaps will be necessary to fully evaluate and 28 mitigate spillover risk of these viruses, especially in light of global agricultural intensification. 29 30
Introduction 34 35
The list of bat-borne viruses known to cause morbidity and mortality in domesticated 36 animals, wildlife, and people continues to grow (Moratelli and Calisher, 2015) . Many such 37 viruses have pandemic potential and cause severe disease in recipient hosts, raising concern for 38 public health, agriculture, and conservation (Calisher et al. The emergence of bat-borne henipaviruses and filoviruses has prompted frequent calls for 79 a "One Health" approach to mitigating their risk to people and animals (Plowright et 
1)
They pertain to henipa-or filovirus infection in our selected set of 111 domesticated animals (e.g., excluding laboratory rodents). 112
2)
They are not comment, opinion, or review articles. 113
3)
They have not been retracted or followed by an expression of concern. 114 115 1 Murray et al., 1995a; Murray et al., 1995b; Selvey and McCormack, 1995; Hooper et al., 1996; McCormack et al., 1996; Rogers et al., 1996; Ward et al., 1996; Westbury et al., 1996; Hooper et al., 1997a; Hooper et al., 1997b; O'Sullivan et al., 1997; Paterson et al., 1998; Williamson et al., 1998; Chua et al., 1999 We produced plots using the mapdata, ggplot2, and treemap packages in R. HeV outbreak in Queensland, Australia, but serum neutralization testing provided no evidence of 233 infection (Rogers et al., 1996) . Of two cats sampled in Ghana during a wider study on 234 henipavirus epidemiology, both tested seronegative to henipavirus (Hayman et al., 2011) . The 235 only investigation of the susceptibility of the domestic cat to any filovirus infection is an in vitro 236 study (Han et al., 2016) . This study assessed the glycoprotein-mediated entry of EBOV into 237 primary feline cells, and found they were more susceptible to EBOV entry than canine cells, but 238 cattle or 21 combined turkeys, geese, and chickens (Rogers et al., 1996) . No studies returned in 270 our search have looked for evidence of susceptibility to, or infection with, filoviruses in either 271 cattle or poultry, but one study that fell outside our search terms reported no evidence of EBOVinfection in tissues from fewer than five chickens collected in the Democratic Republic of the 273
Congo and Cameroon (Breman et al., 1999). 274 275

Intra-and interspecific transmission 276 277
Figure 2. Summary of suggested routes of interspecies transmission for NiV (yellow), 278
HeV (red), and ebolaviruses (blue) to and from domesticated animals. The species represented 279 are goats, poultry, pigs, dogs, cats, horses, and cattle. Plus symbols indicate known susceptibility 280 to infection of a domesticated animal species, while filled and open/dashed circles indicate 281 intraspecific transmission in natural and controlled settings, respectively. Solid and dashed lines 282 represent transmission that has been observed or suspected in natural and experimental 283 conditions, respectively. Carrion, rather than direct transmission from bats, has been suggested 284 as a source of EBOV infection in dogs (Allela et al., 2005). NiV-associated mortality has been 285 demonstrated in chicken eggs, but not in live chickens. Known or suspected direct transmission 286 from wildlife to people is not represented. We found no evidence of transmission from other 287 wildlife host species (e.g. EBOV from nonhuman primates) to domesticated animals. 288 289
All interspecific transmission routes for which we found evidence of domesticated animal 290 involvement are summarized in Excepting laboratory studies (for which locations were not always listed or relevant), 338
Australia was the best-represented region, comprising 41% of geographically specific studies, 339 followed by East and Southeast Asia with 36%, Africa with 18%, and South Asia with 4.5%.
Only one study in East or Southeast Asia investigated ebolaviruses (specifically RESTV). 341
Similarly, all but one study in Australia focused on HeV, and both studies in South Asia (for a 342 total of eight species-specific investigations) focused on NiV in Bangladesh. At least five 343 domesticated animal species were studied per region. 
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as reported by the FAO. 
